
Just over two years after the laboratory at Los Alamos opened its doors, the many parts of the Manhattan Project were at last coming together. Though the urgency and necessity of the project’s success were initially fueled by the threat of a German nuclear bomb, the plan was never to use a working weapon against a specific German target. This was in part because of the risks associated with a failed device falling into German scientists’ hands. Instead, the earliest known plan, discussed among Gen. Leslie R. Groves and a small group of advisers in May of 1943, was to detonate the first bomb above the Japanese fleet stationed at Truk Harbor; if the weapon was a dud, it would ideally be lost in the deep ocean, and if it was recovered, it would not be the Germans who obtained nuclear secrets for their own use. Such precautionary thinking dissolved by mid-1944—as the tide of war turned in the Allies’ favor—into the expectation that Hitler’s regime would unravel before either a German or American atomic bomb became available.
Indeed, when the Soviet army took Berlin in April of 1945, the German dictator took his own life; a week later—on the day of the 100-ton test—Germany surrendered unconditionally. Despite the fall of Japan’s only remaining ally and the end of fighting in Europe, the lengthy conflict in the Pacific Theater wore on. Hundreds of American bombers, launching air raids from captured islands, continued to bring the full might of conventional firepower to major cities across Japan; the devastating attacks killed and injured hundreds of thousands of civilians. At the same time, a naval blockade hindered the Japanese government’s efforts to transport food, reinforcements, and other supplies. An eventual invasion of the mainland, though costly to both sides, would inevitably end in an Allied victory if carried out. And yet, Japanese leaders—for numerous reasons, including the desire to retain the nation’s Imperial system of government—were unwilling to accept the unconditional surrender demanded by the United States.
As the bloody, nearly three-month Battle of Okinawa was unfolding in the Pacific (through late June of 1945) and as development of the Gadget progressed on the home front, scientists and government officials alike began turning attention to the prospect of a successful test at Trinity. President Harry S. Truman, inaugurated on April 12 following the sudden death of Roosevelt, had inherited his predecessor’s commitment to the Manhattan Project and a fast-approaching decision as commander in chief that had been discussed abstractly but was now an imminent reality—how to leverage a working atomic bomb. With Truman’s approval, Secretary of War Henry Stimson convened a civilian advisory group called the Interim Committee on Nuclear Power, which considered throughout May and into June the long-term implications and policy decisions attached to nuclear technology as well as the more immediate question of how it could be used to secure Japan’s surrender.
A Scientific Panel that included Oppenheimer and Fermi represented the views of the weapon’s creators to the Interim Committee. Scientists’ opinions ranged broadly: Some advocated for a technical demonstration, fearing that military use would prejudice the United States’ ability to negotiate an international ban on nuclear arsenals. Others supported military use, emphasizing the opportunity to hasten the end of the war and the possibility that the existence of nuclear arsenals could prevent future wars altogether. In a June 16 letter, the Scientific Panel endorsed this latter view, expressing an “obligation to our nation to use the weapons to help save American lives.” They concluded that a technical demonstration was unlikely to make an impact strong enough to induce surrender.
The Interim Committee concurred, reaffirming its earlier recommendation that the weapon should be used as soon as possible, no warning should be given, and the strike should be against a dual target: a war plant surrounded by workers’ homes. It also suggested that President Truman reveal the atomic bomb’s existence at a forthcoming meeting in Potsdam, Germany, between the leaders of the Big Three—the United States, Great Britain (already involved in the Manhattan Project), and the Soviet Union. Among other advantages, alerting Soviet leader Joseph Stalin—a close ally during the war but an ideological adversary—to the bomb’s existence might help soften the Soviets’ bargaining posture and increase the likelihood of future cooperation in establishing international controls for nuclear weapons.
Going into policy negotiations, Truman needed to know if the United States possessed a nuclear monopoly. With the Potsdam Conference set to begin on July 17, the laboratory’s Cowpuncher Committee, responsible for keeping the Trinity schedule on track, asked managers on June 30 to provide the earliest possible date by which their respective groups, including those scrambling to prepare the Gadget, would be ready for the test. A new target date of July 16 emerged, aligning just barely with political needs. But project meteorologist Jack Hubbard—tasked with identifying feasible conditions for the test shot—predicted a problem that might jeopardize the operation: stormy skies.
Despite potential interference from the weather, a detailed schedule for pre-test dry runs and the eventual “TR Hot Run”—the full-scale test shot—was issued on July 1. While Hubbard closely tracked the forecast, a rush of final construction and calibration at Trinity came to a close as the test device began arriving in pieces on July 12. Near the end of the Hot Run schedule, concluding the day of July 14, two underlined words announced that scientists would soon cede control over their creation to the natural process of fission and then—if their efforts were successful—to the waiting US military: Gadget complete.
Reprinted with permission from Trinity: An Illustrated History of the World’s First Atomic Test by Emily Seyl with contributions by Alan B. Carr, published by The University of Chicago Press. © 2026 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.
